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3.6

ARGUMENT
This case is a relatively simply one. Kriser, as a developer, sold a parcel of land
directly to the Andersons. (R. at 2, 199.) Kriser failed to inform the Andersons of the
presence of a geotechnical report. Id. Without that crucial knowledge, the Andersons
built a house on the land. Because the Andersons were unaware of the condition of the
soil their house settled and was damaged. (R. at 2.)
The first question at issue in this appeal is whether, as a developer, Kriser - not the
builder, not another company - owed a duty of disclosure to the Andersons. Under Utah
law, the answer is yes, because the parties were in privity of contract. Second, the
question is whether that duty of disclosure included the presence of a geotechnical report.
Again, under Utah law, the answer is yes, because the report indicated that, as-is, the land
was not suitable for residential building. Finally, the question is whether knowledge of
the contents of the report can be imputed to Kriser under the existing case law. Again,
under Utah law, the answer is yes, because he was aware that a report had been
completed on the relevant subdivision. Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
I.

AS A DEVELOPER, KRISER OWED A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO THE
ANDERSONS.
Kriser owed his purchasers, the Andersons, a duty of disclosure. Utah case law is

unequivocally clear on the issue of whether a developer owes a purchaser a duty of
disclosure:
[A] developer, subdivider or person performing similar tasks has ; a duty to
exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must
disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably
1

ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building. He has a further duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has
developed in the course of the subdivision process which is relevant to the
suitability of the land for its expected use.*
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, % 16, 94 P.3d 919 (quoting Loveland v. Or em City Corp.,
746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added).
The court of appeals misinterpreted Smith when it erroneously held that 4'[i]t is
clear from Smith v. Frandsen that ultimate responsibility for the settling and other
damage to the Andersons} house lies with the builder-contractor who actually
constructed it" Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, % 6 (emphasis added). In Smith,
the developer sold a lot to a builder, and the builder, in turn, sold it to the homeowners.
Smith, 2004 UT 55, Yd 3-4. The homeowners then sued, among others, the developer. Id.
T| 5. The court held that the developer was not liable to the homeowners because the
developer transferred the land to a contractor, whose knowledge and expertise relieved
the developer of its duty to future remote purchasers. Id. *\\ 21.
In this case, Kriser and the Andersons were in privity of contract.1 The developer,
Kriser, sold the lot directly to the homeowners, the Andersons. The presence of a
subsequent builder is irrelevant. Utah courts have universally held that the developer, or
a person performing similar tasks, owes a duty of disclosure "to his purchaser/5 Smith,
2004 UT 55, *\ 16, and that a developer's uduty of care and disclosure extend[s] . . . to its
1

Kriser argues in his brief that he was not the developer and was simply working for
Country Living Development, LLC. However, Kriser signed the "offer to purchase" in
his personal capacity, and the Andersons were not aware of the existence of Country
Living Development at the time of the purchase. (R. at 2, 199, 215.) Kriser cannot,
therefore, hide behind the entity. In its decision, the court of appeals appears to assume
that Kriser is a developer under the facts of this case.

immediate transferees." Id. \ 28. Indeed, no transferee is more immediate than a
homeowner who purchased a lot directly from a developer, as is the case here.
Under Utah law, Kriser, the developer, owed a duty of disclosure to his purchaser,
the Andersons. Because the decision of the court of appeals contradicts this clear
principle of Utah law. this Court should reverse and remand.

II.

KRISER HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE
GEOTECH REPORT.
Utah law clearly imposes a duty of disclosure upon a developer to disclose *;any

condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots
unsuitable for such residential building. He has a further duty to disclose, upon inquiry,
information he has developed in the course of the subdivision process which is relevant to
the suitability of the land for its expected use." Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, % 16, 94
P.3d 919 (quoting Lovelandv. Or em City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987))
(emphasis added). Utah courts have imposed this duty of disclosure on developers in
order to "protect unsophisticated purchasers," such as the Andersons. Id.
The presence of a geotech report that indicates that the soils are not stable and that
precautions need to be taken when building upon such soils is precisely the kind of
information that developers like Kriser should and must, under Utah law, disclose to their
purchasers, in this case the Andersons.2 The Geotech Report in this case indicated that
the Andersons' plot was unsuitable for residential building because "the soil profile

" Whether the Geotech Report is "material'' within the meaning of the claim of fraudulent
concealment is likely a question of fact, best left to the factfinder. See Yazd v. Woodside
Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, % 28 ; 143 P.3d 283.
3

varied across the [subdivision]" (r. at 218); "the clays on the site were found to be soft
and slightly collapsible wrhen w7etted" (r. at 218. 221, 223); "[pjroper drainage is
important to the performance of the footings for [the structures that will be built]"(r. at
219); and "[w]etting of the foundation soils may cause some degree of volume change
within the soil and should be prevented both during and after construction'' (r. at 224).
Because of these soil conditions, the report recommended a host of precautions, including
that "[fjopsoil, man-made fill, or soils loosened by construction activities should be
removed from the building pad and pavement areas prior to foundation excavations and
site grading fills" (r. at 221); "[foundations should be excavated down to the dense,
sandy gravels or, if in silts or clays, at least 12inches [sic] beyond the bottom footings" (r.
at 221); and "[sjoft spots identified during proof rolling should be excavated and replaced
with structural fill" (r. at 221).
Kriser would have this Court excuse him from a duty to disclose the Geotech
Report because "the soils report does not indicate that the property is unsuitable for
residential building, but only indicates that throughout the subdivision there were some
areas of collapsible soils requiring compaction prior to building." Appellee's Brief, p.
13. However, this is exactly the kind of information that unsophisticated buyers, such as
the Andersons, are incapable of acquiring for themselves. The land purchased by the
Andersons was clearly not suitable for building in the condition in which ICriser sold it to
them. The Andersons needed to know about the soils report in order to comply with the
engineering recommendations and make the land safe to build upon.

4

Further. Kriser w7ould have this Court excuse him from liability because the
Andersons did not inquire as to the presence of a geotech report. Utah law. however,
does not excuse Kriser from his duty. As stated above. Utah courts impose a duty on
developers to disclose any condition which would make the subdivided lots unsuitable for
such residential building in order to "protect unsophisticated purchasers.'* such as the
Andersons. The very fact that purchasers are unsophisticated prevents them from
knowing enough to even inquire as to the existence of a geotechnical report. It is
disingenuous of Kriser to claim that his duty to disclose the Geotech Report would arise
only upon inquiry.
Because the Geotech Report indicated that the lot purchased by the Andersons was
not suitable for residential building, Kriser, the developer, had a duty to disclosure the
existence of the report to the Andersons. This Court should therefore reverse and
remand.
III.

KRISER KNEW OR OUGHT TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE GEOTECH
REPORT INDICATED THAT THE ANDERSONS' LOT WAS
UNSUITABLE FOR RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION.
Kriser reasonably ought to know that the existence of the Geotech Report w7as

material and could affect the suitability of the land for residential building. Again, the
law is quite clear on this point:
[A] developer, subdivider or person performing similar tasks has 'a duty to
exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must
disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably
ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building. He has a further duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has

5

developed in the course of the subdivision process which is relevant to the
suitability of the land for its expected use/
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, % 16, 94 P.3d 919 (quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp.,
746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added).
According to this Court a developer, like Kriser, c;ought to know5' about soil
conditions because the business of subdividing and home construction requires a high
degree of skill, knowledge, and expertise, "including knowledge of soil conditions."
Yazd, 2006 UT 47, ^| 24. And the disparity in that skill and knowledge between a home
buyer and a developer leads to the buyer relying on the expertise of the developer. Id.
Kriser testified in his deposition that he knew Pleasant Grove City required a
geotechnical study before the streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.)
He went even further and clarified that he "knew that [a geotechnical report] had to be
done before [Pleasant Grove City] would allow us to develop [the Subdivision].-'- (R. at
202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.)
Therefore, even if Kriser did not have "actual knowledge5' of the contents of the
Geotech Report, as a developer, he reasonably ought to have known that a report had
been done because the city allowed him to develop the subdivision. He therefore ought
to have disclosed it to the Andersons, according to Yazd. Any other holding w7ould result
in an absurd standard. Under the standard promulgated by Kriser, a developer like Kriser
could get a geotechnical report or know of such a report but never read it never have
"actual knowledge" of its contents, and therefore escape liability for soil conditions on
the land. Surely the law does not reward such willful ignorance.

6

Because Kriser ought to have known that the Geotech Report was material and
relevant to whether the land was suitable for residential construction, he ought to have
disclosed the report to the Andersons.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and
remand this case to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of June 2010.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Stephen] Quesenberry
Jessicg/Griffin Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners
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